{"id":31141,"date":"2026-08-20T18:45:50","date_gmt":"2026-08-20T18:45:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/?p=31141"},"modified":"2026-08-20T18:45:50","modified_gmt":"2026-08-20T18:45:50","slug":"irans-positions-remain-firm-regarding-the-strait-of-hormuz-it-states-that-the-situation-will-not-return-to-the-way-it-was-before","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/irans-positions-remain-firm-regarding-the-strait-of-hormuz-it-states-that-the-situation-will-not-return-to-the-way-it-was-before\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s positions remain firm; regarding the Strait of Hormuz, it states that the situation will not return to the way it was before."},"content":{"rendered":"

Yes, and this is a very important point. I agree that the Iranian statement should not be interpreted merely as a threat to close the Strait of Hormuz<\/strong>. The declared position, first stated in March and reiterated later, is that the Strait of Hormuz will not return to the arrangements that existed before the war<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

On March 25, the spokesman for the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters said that the situation in the Strait \u201cwill not return to the past,\u201d and that permission for passage would be determined by Iran<\/strong>. Then, in June, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reiterated that the Strait would not return to its previous operational status and that Iran would manage the passageway under new arrangements.<\/h4>\n

In my view, the Iranian statement therefore carries a much broader strategic dimension than simply closing the Strait<\/strong>:<\/h4>\n
    \n
  • Before the war:<\/strong> Passage through the Strait of Hormuz was treated as something close to routine.<\/li>\n
  • After the war:<\/strong> Tehran wants passage to become subject to a new security and political framework<\/strong>.<\/li>\n
  • Vessels belonging to adversaries:<\/strong> They may face restrictions or be denied passage.<\/li>\n
  • Neutral or friendly countries:<\/strong> Their vessels could continue to pass, but under arrangements established by Iran and Oman.<\/li>\n
  • The central message:<\/strong> Iran does not want to return to a situation in which freedom of navigation through Hormuz is effectively understood as an unconditional right for all parties.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    This becomes even clearer in light of recent developments. There has been discussion of new Iranian-Omani arrangements for managing maritime traffic, while Tehran and Washington differ over the nature of these arrangements and over who has the authority to determine shipping routes.<\/h4>\n

    Therefore, I would revise my previous assessment:<\/strong> If the Iranian leadership genuinely remains committed to this position, I do not expect Hormuz to return to its \u201cold normal\u201d<\/strong> even if the war subsides.<\/h4>\n

    The more likely outcome is the emergence of a \u201cNew Hormuz\u201d<\/strong>: a strait that remains partially open or regulated, but in which Iran retains a real capacity to determine who passes, when they pass, and under what conditions<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

    In my view, this is more significant than closure itself, because Iran could transform Hormuz from a card used only when war breaks out into a permanent strategic instrument in any regional or international negotiation.<\/strong><\/h4>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Yes, and this is a very important point. I agree that the Iranian statement should not be interpreted merely as a threat to close the Strait of Hormuz. The declared position, first stated in March and reiterated later, is that the Strait of Hormuz will not return to the arrangements that existed before the war. …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":31139,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"iawp_total_views":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1485],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-31141","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","","category-various-articles"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31141","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=31141"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31141\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":31142,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31141\/revisions\/31142"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/31139"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=31141"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=31141"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=31141"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}