{"id":31145,"date":"2026-08-29T18:50:43","date_gmt":"2026-08-29T18:50:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/?p=31145"},"modified":"2026-08-20T18:53:42","modified_gmt":"2026-08-20T18:53:42","slug":"what-about-the-civilian-and-military-internet-cables-on-the-seabed-of-the-strait-of-hormuz","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/what-about-the-civilian-and-military-internet-cables-on-the-seabed-of-the-strait-of-hormuz\/","title":{"rendered":"What about the civilian and military internet cables on the seabed of the Strait of Hormuz?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Yes, and this is a very important strategic point<\/strong> in understanding the future of the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait is not merely a route for oil and gas tankers; there is also digital infrastructure on its seabed<\/strong>, consisting of fiber-optic cables that connect the Gulf states to global Internet networks.<\/p>\n

According to the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), there are currently five active segments of submarine cable systems that pass through the Strait of Hormuz itself<\/strong>, in addition to other systems in the surrounding area. Some of these connect to landing stations in the Gulf states, and there are also two cables that connect to Iran.<\/h4>\n

Why are these cables important?<\/h4>\n

These cables carry:<\/p>\n

    \n
  • Internet traffic between the Gulf, Asia, and Europe.<\/strong><\/li>\n
  • International communications.<\/strong><\/li>\n
  • Cloud-computing and data-center services.<\/strong><\/li>\n
  • Banking and electronic payment services.<\/strong><\/li>\n
  • Part of the data traffic of companies and government institutions.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Some of the major systems associated with the Hormuz region include:<\/h4>\n

    FALCON, AAE-1, and the Gulf Bridge International Cable System (GBICS),<\/strong><\/p>\n

    along with other systems.<\/p>\n

    But an important misconception needs to be corrected:<\/h4>\n

    The Strait of Hormuz does not carry 99% of the world\u2019s Internet traffic.<\/strong><\/p>\n

    The roughly 99% figure refers to the share of global Internet traffic that travels through submarine cables in general<\/strong>. The share of international global capacity represented by cables specifically passing through Hormuz is less than 1%<\/strong>, according to the International Cable Protection Committee. Their impact is therefore highly significant regionally<\/strong>, rather than being capable of paralyzing the global Internet.<\/p>\n

    What about military cables?<\/h4>\n

    This is where caution is necessary regarding information circulating publicly.<\/p>\n

    There is no reliable publicly available information confirming the existence of specific \u201csecret military Internet cables\u201d on the seabed of the Strait of Hormuz whose routes can be identified.<\/strong> Sensitive military cable routes are generally not disclosed for security reasons.<\/p>\n

    However, that does not mean that undersea military communications do not exist. Technically and strategically, government and military communications networks can use:<\/p>\n

      \n
    • Dedicated submarine cables,<\/strong><\/li>\n
    • Fiber-optic infrastructure within civilian telecommunications networks,<\/strong><\/li>\n
    • Terrestrial networks,<\/strong><\/li>\n
    • Satellite communications,<\/strong><\/li>\n
    • Or other military communications systems.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      I cannot confirm the existence of any particular military cable in Hormuz without a reliable source.<\/p>\n

      More importantly, this brings us back to the earlier issue<\/h4>\n

      This is where Iran\u2019s statement that \u201cHormuz will not return to its previous state\u201d<\/strong> becomes particularly significant.<\/h3>\n

      Because control or influence over Hormuz in the future is not necessarily limited to ships.<\/p>\n

      There are effectively three strategic levels<\/strong>:<\/p>\n

      Oil and Gas<\/strong><\/h3>\n

      Energy tankers.<\/p>\n

      Trade<\/strong><\/h3>\n

      Container ships and cargo vessels.<\/p>\n

      The Digital Economy<\/strong><\/h3>\n

      Fiber-optic cables on the seabed.<\/p>\n

      And this is why the current war has raised serious concerns about the cables themselves.<\/p>\n

      Reuters has described Hormuz as a \u201cdigital chokepoint\u201d<\/strong> as well as an energy chokepoint, noting that repairing cables during a conflict can become extremely difficult because of risks, mines, and the need for authorization.<\/p>\n

      It is also noteworthy that Iran reportedly discussed in May 2026 imposing fees on submarine cables passing through Hormuz<\/strong>, raising the question of whether Tehran is attempting to expand its concept of managing the Strait from control over shipping to the digital infrastructure on its seabed<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

      In my view, this is a particularly important point:<\/strong><\/h4>\n

      If Iran genuinely intends to establish a \u201cNew Hormuz,\u201d<\/strong> the question is not only:<\/p>\n

      Who is allowed to pass over the water?<\/em><\/p>\n

      It is also:<\/p>\n

      Who is allowed to use the infrastructure beneath the water?<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      Yes, and this is a very important strategic point in understanding the future of the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait is not merely a route for oil and gas tankers; there is also digital infrastructure on its seabed, consisting of fiber-optic cables that connect the Gulf states to global Internet networks. According to the International …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":31139,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"iawp_total_views":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1485],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-31145","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","","category-various-articles"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31145","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=31145"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31145\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":31146,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31145\/revisions\/31146"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/31139"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=31145"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=31145"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=31145"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}