Haydari Nazar<\/p>\n
29<\/p>\n
If we assume a hypothetical scenario in which the United States is forced to evacuate its military bases in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and Iraq, one after another,<\/p>\n
this would represent a very major strategic shift, but it would not automatically mean that America is leaving the Middle East. More importantly, this scenario is not entirely theoretical: current reports speak of pressure and negotiations related to the presence of U.S. forces, while Iran says that keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed is linked to conditions that include ending U.S. military activity in the region.<\/p>\n
1. Bahrain: Loss of the Fifth Fleet Hub<\/p>\n
Bahrain is the most sensitive link from a naval perspective. The U.S. Navy\u2019s presence there is connected to the command of the Fifth Fleet and naval operations in the Gulf.<\/p>\n
If America leaves Bahrain, it would lose:<\/p>\n
– An advanced naval command center located very close to the Strait of Hormuz.
\n– An important part of its ability to monitor the Gulf.
\n– The logistical infrastructure that allows U.S. ships to remain in the region for extended periods.<\/p>\n
The result: The U.S. Navy would have to operate from more distant locations, such as the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n
2. Qatar: Loss of the Air Power Center<\/p>\n
A U.S. withdrawal from Al Udeid would mean losing one of America\u2019s most important air-power hubs in the region. Al Udeid is considered a major center for U.S. air operations and command in the region.<\/p>\n
The impact here would be different from Bahrain:<\/p>\n
Bahrain = a naval blow.
\nQatar = an air-power and command blow.<\/p>\n
The United States would need to distribute its aircraft and command capabilities among a larger number of bases outside the Gulf.<\/p>\n
3. Kuwait: Loss of Strategic Ground Depth<\/p>\n
Kuwait is particularly important for deployment, logistics, and ground forces.<\/p>\n
If U.S. forces leave Kuwait, it would become more difficult for Washington to use the Gulf as a platform for a major ground operation against Iran.<\/p>\n
This produces an important strategic consequence:<\/p>\n
The more bases America loses in the Gulf, the more Iran shifts from being a country confronting a U.S. military force deployed around it to a country facing a U.S. military force operating from greater distances.<\/p>\n
4. UAE: Loss of Another Forward Base<\/p>\n
The UAE is important for American air, naval, and logistical capabilities.<\/p>\n
However, a U.S. withdrawal from the UAE would have less impact than losing Bahrain and Qatar in terms of central command. Washington could therefore compensate for part of the loss by relocating forces to other locations.<\/p>\n
5. Iraq: A Different Kind of Loss<\/p>\n
A U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would have a major political and strategic impact because it would mean that the United States no longer had that kind of ground depth close to Iran.<\/p>\n
This would change the map:<\/p>\n
Iraq \u2192 Kuwait \u2192 Bahrain \u2192 Qatar \u2192 UAE<\/p>\n
If America withdrew from this chain, it would lose much of its forward-deployment network inside the Gulf.<\/p>\n
This is consistent with previous studies of the U.S. military presence, which have regarded Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE as the four main pillars of the American military presence in the Gulf.<\/p>\n
What Happens Next?<\/p>\n
Here the issue becomes more important than simply saying, \u201cAmerica has withdrawn.\u201d<\/p>\n
Iran would become the strongest military-geographic power in the Gulf.<\/p>\n
However, a distinction must be made between:<\/p>\n
control over the Strait of Hormuz
\nand
\ncontrol over the entire Gulf.<\/p>\n
Iran having a significant ability to control maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz does not mean that it can prevent every U.S. naval force from approaching the Arabian Sea or the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n
Oman Becomes More Important<\/p>\n
If America leaves the Gulf, Oman\u2019s importance would increase enormously because of its location outside the Gulf and its proximity to the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz.<\/p>\n
Muscat could become a major security and political intermediary between Iran, the United States, and the Gulf states.<\/p>\n
Saudi Arabia<\/p>\n
Saudi Arabia would become the most important Gulf state for America.<\/p>\n
If U.S. bases remain in Saudi Arabia, or if Washington retains the ability to use them, the United States would rely on Saudi Arabia more heavily.<\/p>\n
But if the scenario were to extend to Saudi Arabia as well, the transformation would be much greater.<\/p>\n
What Would This Mean for the United States?<\/p>\n
The United States would effectively shift from:<\/p>\n
the Gulf \u2192 to the Gulf\u2019s periphery and the Arabian Sea.<\/p>\n
What Would the Gulf States Do?<\/p>\n
Here, I believe the greatest consequence would be the rebuilding of Gulf security on a regional basis.<\/p>\n
Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE would not be able simply to rely on the old American security umbrella.<\/p>\n
They would need to:<\/p>\n
– Strengthen air and missile defenses.
\n– Develop their naval forces.
\n– Increase Gulf-wide coordination.
\n– Open direct security channels with Iran.
\n– Possibly establish new security arrangements with China, Russia, and other countries.<\/p>\n
This is particularly important because the Gulf states themselves were subjected to attacks during the current crisis, making the issue of complete reliance on American protection a subject of debate.<\/p>\n
The Major Consequence<\/p>\n
If the withdrawal occurred gradually and was driven by Washington\u2019s inability to maintain its bases, it would be much more than a military withdrawal.<\/p>\n
It would represent a transition from:<\/p>\n
the American-led Gulf security system<\/p>\n
to:<\/p>\n
a multipolar security system, in which Iran would be the primary geographic and military power in the Gulf, while America would remain an external power capable of intervening from outside the region.<\/p>\n
However, I do not think Washington would simply say:<\/p>\n
\u201cWe have lost the Gulf, so let us leave.\u201d<\/p>\n
More likely, it would do something more sophisticated:<\/p>\n
Withdraw forces from locations that have become too costly and dangerous, move them to more distant and safer positions, while retaining the ability to return and intervene when necessary.<\/p>\n
And this is precisely what makes the Strait of Hormuz more important than merely an oil passage:<\/p>\n
If Iran becomes capable of imposing rules governing passage through the strait, while U.S. forces can no longer use bases close to it, the balance of power in the Gulf changes\u2014even if the United States remains a global military power.<\/p>\n
And currently,<\/p>\n
on August 11, 2026, Iran\u2019s declared position was more hard-line: Tehran linked the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to conditions that included ending U.S. military activity in the region. This makes the issue of military bases a direct part of the negotiations rather than merely a separate military matter.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Haydari Nazar 29 If we assume a hypothetical scenario in which the United States is forced to evacuate its military bases in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and Iraq, one after another, this would represent a very major strategic shift, but it would not automatically mean that America is leaving the Middle East. More importantly, …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":31139,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"iawp_total_views":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1485],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-31236","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","","category-various-articles"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31236","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=31236"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31236\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":31261,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31236\/revisions\/31261"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/31139"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=31236"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=31236"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=31236"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}