Haydari Nazar<\/p>\n
32<\/p>\n[Al-Wilayah News]\n
Home \/ Reports \/ If Iran Charges $2 Million per Passing Ship, What Share Would the Gulf States Receive?<\/p>\n
If Iran Charges $2 Million per Passing Ship, What Share Would the Gulf States Receive?<\/p>\n
3 weeks ago \u2014 Reports \u2014 74 views<\/p>\n
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32<\/p>\n
If you mean hypothetically that Iran receives $2 million for every ship, the calculation is simple. However, there is an important point: the figure being circulated is up to $2 million for certain voyages, not a fixed publicly announced tariff for every ship. Iran initially denied that there was an official fixed fee of this amount, but later reports emerged about actual fees being collected from some vessels.<\/p>\n
If your question is: What could the share of the Gulf states bordering the strait be from these fees?<\/p>\n
There is currently, according to what I have found, no publicly announced fixed percentage, such as 50% for Iran and 50% for Oman. Rather, the Omani proposal currently under discussion refers to regional management of the strait and voluntary fees. In the latest negotiations, Iran is demanding control over inbound traffic and supervision of outbound traffic, while Oman would issue outbound transit permits.<\/p>\n
But we can make a hypothetical calculation:<\/p>\n
If we assume there are 100 ships per day, and each ship pays $2 million:<\/p>\n
100 \u00d7 $2 million = $200 million per day<\/p>\n
That would amount to approximately:<\/p>\n
– $6 billion per month.<\/p>\n
– $73 billion per year.<\/p>\n
If Iran and Oman, for example, agreed to divide the fees 50\/50:<\/p>\n
– Iran: $36.5 billion per year
\n– Oman: $36.5 billion per year<\/p>\n
If the division were 70% for Iran and 30% for Oman:<\/p>\n
– Iran: $51.1 billion
\n– Oman: $21.9 billion<\/p>\n
But these are only mathematical models; there is no announced agreement based on these percentages.<\/p>\n
More importantly, the number of ships passing through Hormuz is not the same as the number of oil tankers. The strait serves many different types of vessels, and the $2 million figure has not been established as a uniform tariff for all of them. Therefore, it would not be correct to multiply this figure directly by all annual maritime movements and present the result as \u201cguaranteed revenue.\u201d<\/p>\n
If you wish, I can calculate a more realistic scenario:<\/p>\n
How much could Iran, Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain receive from a Hormuz system if fees were imposed on ships, energy, and submarine cables?<\/p>\n
Correct. That is a valid point if we are talking about the distribution of potential regional revenues from the Hormuz system, rather than a fee imposed solely by Iran.<\/p>\n
But there is an important correction: Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain are beneficiaries of the strait and are economically connected to it, but they are not all littoral states of the Strait of Hormuz itself. Geographically, the strait lies between Iran and Oman, while the other Gulf states depend on it for the export and import of goods and energy. The International Energy Agency notes that Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain depend on Hormuz to export most of their oil, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE have some alternatives through pipelines.<\/p>\n
Therefore, if we assume a new political scenario in which a regional system is established to manage navigation and collect, for example, \u201cservice fees,\u201d it would be more logical to have a distribution mechanism, rather than allowing all revenues to go to Iran.<\/p>\n
For example, hypothetically:<\/p>\n
100 ships per day \u00d7 $2 million = $200 million per day<\/p>\n
That is approximately $73 billion per year.<\/p>\n
One could envision a regional fund rather than an equal division, for example:<\/p>\n
State| Hypothetical Share
\nIran| 35%
\nOman| 25%
\nUAE| 10%
\nSaudi Arabia| 8%
\nKuwait| 7%
\nQatar| 6%
\nBahrain| 4%
\nIraq| 3%
\nTotal| 100%<\/p>\n
Under this example, Iran’s share would be approximately $25.6 billion per year, while Oman’s share would be $18.25 billion, with the remainder distributed according to each state’s contribution to maritime security and infrastructure and the extent to which it benefits from the passage.<\/p>\n
However, these percentages are my own illustrative assumptions and do not represent an existing agreement. More importantly, the current negotiations between Iran and Oman do in fact discuss fees for services, security, and environmental maintenance, while disagreement continues over who should manage inbound and outbound traffic.<\/p>\n
And here I believe you are touching on a deeper strategic point: if Hormuz is transformed into a regional maritime-management system, the Gulf states may not merely demand a share of the fees. They could also have a stake in managing security, ports, submarine cables, and maritime infrastructure.<\/p>\n
As for saying that \u201cevery Gulf state has an automatic legal entitlement to a share of transit fees,\u201d that would not be accurate. The international legal position regarding transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz is complex and contested, and some Gulf states have explicitly rejected the imposition of transit fees or a unilateral permit system.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Haydari Nazar 32 [Al-Wilayah News] Home \/ Reports \/ If Iran Charges $2 Million per Passing Ship, What Share Would the Gulf States Receive? If Iran Charges $2 Million per Passing Ship, What Share Would the Gulf States Receive? 3 weeks ago \u2014 Reports \u2014 74 views \ud835\udc6f\ud835\udc82\ud835\udc9a\ud835\udc85\ud835\udc82\ud835\udc93\ud835\udc8a \ud835\udc75\ud835\udc82\ud835\udc9b\ud835\udc82\ud835\udc93 32 If you mean hypothetically that …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":31139,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"iawp_total_views":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1485],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-31242","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","","category-various-articles"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31242","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=31242"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31242\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":31258,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31242\/revisions\/31258"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/31139"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=31242"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=31242"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=31242"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}