{"id":9410,"date":"2014-06-15T21:46:29","date_gmt":"2014-06-15T21:46:29","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/?p=9410"},"modified":"2014-06-15T21:46:29","modified_gmt":"2014-06-15T21:46:29","slug":"the-iraqi-shia-mobilization-to-counter-the-isis-offensive","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/wilayah.info\/en\/the-iraqi-shia-mobilization-to-counter-the-isis-offensive\/","title":{"rendered":"The Iraqi Shia Mobilization to Counter the ISIS Offensive"},"content":{"rendered":"

Iraq\u2019s Shi\u2019a are mobilizing against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). In addition to fears of ISIS advances towards Baghdad, the Iraqi Shi\u2019a threat perception is magnified by their desire to prevent an ISIS attack on the al-Askari shrine in Samarra. The February 2006 attack on the shrine triggered Iraq\u2019s civil war during which Iraqi Shi\u2019a militias targeted and killed thousands of Iraqis-primarily Iraqi Sunnis-in retaliatory attacks. The protection of the al-Askari shrine is an existential priority for the Iraqi Shi\u2019a and Iran. Protecting the Sayyida Zainab Shrine in Damascus has likewise been a focal point of Iraqi militia mobilization. The concept of shrine protection by the Iraqi Shi\u2019a further solidifies the merger of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi Shi\u2019a had shown restraint in response to ISIS attacks prior to the Iraqi elections in April 2014. However, the ISIS threat to the shrine will unravel that restraint and trigger retaliatory attacks against the Iraqi Sunnis. Destruction of any of these shrines would bring on full scale ethno-sectarian civil war with violence meeting or surpassing 2006 levels.<\/p>\n

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The current Shi\u2019a mobilization, however, differs from that of 2006.\u00a0 It is faster.\u00a0 It took six weeks in 2006 for the Mahdi Army to mobilize, but the Shi\u2019a groups have rallied within a week of the fall of Mosul. There are a number of reasons why militia and defense force mobilization is proceeding so quickly.<\/p>\n

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  1. Shi\u2019a\u00a0militia groups\u00a0such as Badr, the Sadrist Promised Day Brigade, and Asai\u2019b Ahl al-Haq had already mobilized for the 2014 Iraq elections.<\/li>\n
  2. Prime Minister Maliki has been\u00a0incorporating\u00a0Shi\u2019a militias into the Iraqi Security Forces since August 2013.<\/li>\n
  3. Maliki has been\u00a0recruiting tribal\u00a0members into\u00a0protection forces\u00a0since 2013 and has an administrative mechanism and\u00a0recruiting centers\u00a0to do so.<\/li>\n
  4. Shi\u2019a militia groups had a mobilization effort underway for deployments to\u00a0Syria. Commanders of those militias are now\u00a0returning\u00a0to Iraq.<\/li>\n
  5. Iraq has demonstrated its capability to\u00a0move units\u00a0around the battlefield since January, even though these redeployments have been a sign of the ISF\u2019s weakness.<\/li>\n
  6. Grand Ayatollah\u00a0Ali al-Sistani, Iraq\u2019s preeminent Shi\u2019a religious figure called on Iraqis to \u201cvolunteer\u201d in part to protect such shrines.<\/li>\n
  7. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps \u00a0(IRGC) \u2013 Quds Force has freedom of movement in Iraq in 2014 without American troops there.\u00a0 The Quds Force also has developed capacity to integrate units from the \u201cAxis of Resistance,\u201d as it calls its alliance with Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the various elements fighting for the Syrian Regime, and regular Iranian formations functioning as embedded advisory teams. Reports\u00a0surfaced\u00a0on June 14 that IRGC member, Ali Ridha Mashjari, was\u00a0killed\u00a0in \u2018defense of Karbala.\u2019 This reference is to Karbala in Iraq where there are two major shrines and therefore suggests that Mashjari was killed in Iraq.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    These Shi\u2019a groups together are orchestrating a counter-offensive with a rapidity and in numbers that have likely surprised the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, which has hitherto not generated the degree of Shi\u2019a mobilization it has sought from its\u00a0spectacular attacks\u00a0on Shi\u2019a civilian targets. This report will describe the initial outlines of the counteroffensive and its leaders.<\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Prime Minister Maliki visits Samarra<\/strong><\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki\u00a0visited\u00a0Samarra and thereby signaled to the Iraqi Shi\u2019a that protecting\u00a0Samarra\u00a0is a priority for the Iraqi government forces. He met with local security officials to study \u201cthe plans to retake the city of Tikrit.\u201d Tikrit fell to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandia (JRTN) on June 11. Maliki\u2019s visit was\u00a0confirmed\u00a0by Salah ad-Din governor, Ahmed Abdullah al-Juburi. \u00a0Reports also indicate that security forces\u00a0composed\u00a0of army and police headed to Samarra. This ISF element reinforces an additional 1000 volunteers, likely a security contingent from Wasit\u00a0known\u00a0as the \u201cWasit Volcano\u201d battalion, who arrived on June 12. According to Wasit police sources, the battalion already engaged ISIS in a firefight killing 13 ISIS elements.\u00a0 ISIS has responded by attacking the convoy of the\u00a0supervisor\u00a0of the Samarra shrine.<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    Maliki\u2019s visit is an indicator of his strategy. This is his first visit outside of Baghdad since the fall of Mosul and more Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) members, volunteers, Iraqi Shi\u2019a militia members will be sent to shrine.<\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Badr Oversight of Security in Diyala<\/strong><\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    Minister of Transportation and head of the Iranian-backed Badr organization, Hadi al-Ameri, is now in charge of the security portfolio in the province, according to statements by the head of Diyala\u2019s provincial council security committee Sadeq al-Husseini.\u00a0 Badr has a long history in Diyala, along with other Iraqi Shi\u2019a militias who will also play a major role in providing security in Diyala. Badr has deployed its members in Syria and has likely been involved in anti-ISIS Iraqi government measures in the southern belt of Baghdad. Diyala is a critical province where ISIS has\u00a0achieved\u00a0a foothold. \u00a0Initial tactical engagements between ISIS and pro-Maliki elements have occurred in the northern portions of Diyala, including in the vicinity of\u00a0Udhaim, areas east of\u00a0Muqdadiya,<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    Ameri will have the responsibility of coordinating with the ISF and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga who are deployed in the areas of Jalawla and Saadia. According to unnamed Iraqi government officials, 500 Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) members had recently\u00a0deployed\u00a0to Diyala. That statement, however, was denied by the Iranian Foreign Ministry. Visual evidence has yet to surface to prove the presence of IRGC members in Diyala. Nonetheless, it is likely that Ameri will coordinate with the Iranian government and its security services because of Diyala\u2019s shared border with Iran\u00a0and Ameri\u2019s close ties with the Iranian government.<\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Sistani Endorses Volunteers<\/strong><\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    In a significant development, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq\u2019s preeminent Shi\u2019a religious figure\u00a0called\u00a0on Iraqis to volunteer as the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham increases its operations and expresses its intent to attack the al-Askari Shrine in Samarra and Baghdad. Sistani did not make the statement himself, but the stance was conveyed by his representative in Karbala, Abdu al-Mahdi al-Karbalai. Traditionally, Sistani makes his official positions known through these channels.<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    During his June 13 Friday sermon, Karbalai stated that \u201cthe threats posed obligate the volunteering of those who are capable of carrying arms to defend the homeland and it is a duty on [them].\u201d Karbalai also expressed support to the Iraqi Security Forces and given Sistani\u2019s normal nationalistic stance, Karbalai ensured that the statement did not only focus on the Iraqi Shi\u2019a, but that it is rather a \u201cresponsibility\u201d for all Iraqis. Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi, another member of Iraq\u2019s clerical establishment, also\u00a0issued\u00a0a statement calling on Iraqis to join the ISF.<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    The calls from Sistani and Najafi are an expression of grave concern by the Shi\u2019a religious authorities with regards to ISIS and its increased threat. However, these are also calls for Iraqi Shi\u2019a unity. The Iraqi Shi\u2019a see ISIS as an existential threat. The calls will result in increased rates of recruitment.<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    Sistani\u2019s calls for Shi\u2019a unity will also have ramifications in the political sphere.\u00a0 Opportunities to split other Shi\u2019a groups from withdrawing their support from Maliki and forcing him to step down have diminished in the short term, as Amar al-Hakim, Hadi al-Ameri, and Moqtada Sadr have rallied to the cause. These groups may gain leverage over Maliki as a result of their participation, but it is likely that a united Shi\u2019a front loyal to Iran emerges from these conditions if the government survives.<\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Iraqi Shi\u2019a Volunteers<\/strong><\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    In response to the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Salah ad-Din, the Iraqi government started recruitment drives in Baghdad and Iraq\u2019s predominately Iraqi Shi\u2019a provinces.\u00a0 Prime Minister Nouri Al Malikiannounced\u00a0his plans to\u00a0liberate\u00a0Salah ad-Din and Nineveh provinces and areas near Samarra city in a military operation using an army of civilians. The number of volunteers in the civilian security forces increased since the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, called for civilians to volunteer.<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    The provincial recruitment is underway in most Shi\u2019a provinces and Baghdad.<\/p>\n