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If you mean hypothetically that Iran receives $2 million per vessel, the calculation is simple. However, there is an important point: the widely circulated figure is up to $2 million for certain voyages, rather than a fixed tariff officially announced for every vessel. Iran initially denied that there was an official fixed charge of this amount, although later reports emerged suggesting that actual fees had been collected from some vessels.
If your question is: How much could the Gulf states bordering the Strait receive from these fees?
Based on what I have found, there is currently no publicly announced fixed percentage such as 50% for Iran and 50% for Oman. Rather, the Omani proposal currently under discussion refers to regional management of the Strait and voluntary fees. In the latest negotiations, Iran is seeking control over inbound traffic and oversight of outbound traffic, while Oman would issue outbound transit permits.
But we can make a hypothetical calculation:
Suppose there are 100 vessels per day, with each vessel paying $2 million:
100 × $2 million = $200 million per day
That would be approximately:
- $6 billion per month.
- $73 billion per year.
If Iran and Oman agreed, for example, to split the fees 50/50:
- Iran: $36.5 billion per year
- Oman: $36.5 billion per year
If the distribution were 70% for Iran and 30% for Oman:
- Iran: $51.1 billion
- Oman: $21.9 billion
However, these are merely mathematical scenarios; there is no publicly announced agreement establishing these percentages.
More importantly, the number of vessels transiting Hormuz is not the same as the number of oil tankers. The Strait serves many different types of vessels, and the $2 million figure has not been established as a uniform tariff for all of them. Therefore, it would not be accurate to multiply that figure by every annual maritime movement and present the result as guaranteed income.
A more realistic scenario would be to calculate:
How much Iran, Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain could receive from a Hormuz system that imposed fees on vessels, energy shipments, and submarine cables.
That is a valid point if we are talking about distributing potential regional revenues from the Hormuz system rather than a fee imposed by Iran alone.
However, there is an important correction: Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain are economically dependent on and connected to the Strait, but they are not all littoral states of the Strait of Hormuz itself. Geographically, the Strait lies between Iran and Oman, while the other Gulf states depend on it for the export and import of goods and energy.
The International Energy Agency notes that Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain rely on Hormuz for exporting most of their oil, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE have some alternatives through pipelines.
Therefore, if we assume a new political scenario in which a regional system for managing navigation and collecting “service fees” were established, it would be more logical to create a revenue-sharing mechanism rather than have all revenues go to Iran.
For example, purely for illustration, suppose:
100 vessels per day × $2 million = $200 million per day
or approximately $73 billion per year.
One could imagine a regional fund, without necessarily dividing the revenue equally, such as:
| Country | Hypothetical Share |
|---|---|
| Iran | 35% |
| Oman | 25% |
| UAE | 10% |
| Saudi Arabia | 8% |
| Kuwait | 7% |
| Qatar | 6% |
| Bahrain | 4% |
| Iraq | 3% |
| Total | 100% |
Under this example, Iran would receive approximately $25.6 billion per year, Oman $18.25 billion, with the remainder distributed according to each country’s contribution to maritime security, infrastructure, and the benefits it derives from the passage.
However, these percentages are entirely hypothetical and are not part of any existing agreement.
More importantly, the current discussions between Iran and Oman reportedly involve fees for services, security, and environmental maintenance, while disagreement remains over who should control inbound and outbound traffic.
This points to a deeper strategic issue: if Hormuz were transformed into a regional maritime-management system, the Gulf states might seek not merely a share of the fees, but also a role in maritime security, port management, submarine cables, and other maritime infrastructure.
As for the claim that “every Gulf state automatically has a legal entitlement to a share of transit fees,” that would not be accurate. The international legal position concerning transit charges in the Strait of Hormuz is complex and contested, and some Gulf states have explicitly rejected the imposition of transit fees or a unilateral permit system.