Iran’s positions remain firm; regarding the Strait of Hormuz, it states that the situation will not return to the way it was before.

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Haydari Nazar

25

This is a very important point, and I agree with you that the Iranian statement should not be interpreted merely as a threat to close the Strait. The stated position since March, which was reiterated later, is that the Strait of Hormuz will not return to the arrangements that existed before the war.

On March 25, the spokesperson for the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters said that the situation in the Strait “will not return to the past,” and that permission for passage would be determined by Iran. Then, in June, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reiterated that the Strait would not return to its previous operational status and that Iran would manage the passage according to new arrangements.

Here, I believe the Iranian statement carries a much broader strategic dimension than simply closing the Strait:
Before the war: Passage through Hormuz was treated as something close to routine.

After the war: Tehran wants passage to become subject to a new security and political framework.

Vessels belonging to adversaries: They may face restrictions or be denied passage.

Neutral or friendly countries: Their passage could continue, but within arrangements established by Iran and Oman.

The core message: Iran does not want to return to a situation in which freedom of navigation through Hormuz is practically understood as an unconditional right for all parties.
This becomes even clearer from recent developments, as there has been discussion of new Iranian-Omani arrangements for managing maritime traffic, with differences between Tehran and Washington over the nature of these arrangements and who has the authority to determine shipping routes.

Therefore, I would revise my previous assessment: If the Iranian leadership is genuinely committed to this position, I do not expect Hormuz to return to the “old normal” even if the war subsides.

The more likely outcome is the emergence of a “New Hormuz”: a strait that remains partially open or regulated, while Iran retains the practical ability to determine who passes, when they pass, and under what conditions.

In my view, this is more important than closure itself, because Iran could transform Hormuz from a card used only when war breaks out into a permanent strategic card in any regional or international negotiation.