What about the civilian and military internet cables on the seabed of the Strait of Hormuz?

What about the civilian and military internet cables on the seabed of the Strait of Hormuz?
Haydari Nazar
27
This is a very important strategic point in understanding the future of the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait is not only a route for oil and gas tankers; there is also digital infrastructure on its seabed, consisting of fiber-optic cables that connect the Gulf states to global Internet networks.
According to the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), there are currently five active sections of submarine cable systems passing through the Strait of Hormuz itself, in addition to other systems in its vicinity. Some of these connect to landing stations in the Gulf states, and there are also two cables connecting to Iran.
Why are these cables important?
These cables carry:
Internet traffic between the Gulf, Asia, and Europe.
International communications.
Cloud-computing services and data centers.
Banking services and electronic payments.
Part of the data traffic of companies and government institutions.
Among the best-known systems associated with the Hormuz region are:
FALCON, AAE-1, and the Gulf Bridge International Cable System (GBICS),
in addition to other systems.
However, an important misconception should be corrected:
Hormuz does not carry 99% of the world’s Internet traffic.
The roughly 99% figure refers to the share of global Internet traffic that travels through submarine cables in general. The cables specifically passing through Hormuz account for less than 1% of global international capacity, according to the International Cable Protection Committee. Their impact is therefore extremely important regionally, rather than being capable of paralyzing the global Internet.
What about military cables?
This is where we need to be cautious about information circulating publicly.
There is no reliable, publicly available information confirming the existence of specific “secret military Internet cables” on the seabed of the Strait of Hormuz whose routes can be identified. Sensitive military cables generally do not have their routes publicly disclosed for security reasons.
However, this does not mean that underwater military communications do not exist. From a technical and strategic perspective, government and military communications networks may use:
Dedicated submarine cables,
Fiber-optic infrastructure within civilian communications networks,
Terrestrial networks,
Satellites,
Or other military communications systems.
I cannot confirm the existence of any particular military cable in Hormuz without a reliable source.
Most importantly, in relation to our previous discussion:
This is where the significance of Iran’s statement that “Hormuz will not return to its previous status” becomes apparent.
Because future control or influence over Hormuz is not only about ships.
There are actually three strategic levels:
Oil and gas
Energy tankers
Trade
Container ships and cargo vessels
The digital economy
Submarine fiber-optic cables on the seabed
This is why the current war has also raised serious concerns about the cables themselves.
Reuters described Hormuz as a “digital chokepoint” in addition to being an energy chokepoint, and noted that repairing cables during a conflict becomes extremely difficult because of risks, mines, and permit requirements.
It is also noteworthy that Iran spoke in May 2026 about imposing fees on submarine cables passing through Hormuz, which sparked discussion over whether Tehran is seeking to expand its concept of managing the Strait from ships to the digital infrastructure located on its seabed.
And in my view, this is an extremely important point: If Iran genuinely wants to establish a “New Hormuz,” the question is not only who passes over the water? but also who uses the infrastructure beneath the water?

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