WILAYAH NEWS VOICE OF THE GLOBAL AWAKENING
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Haydari Nazar
31
This claim has a basis in recent Iranian statements; it is not merely a rumor. However, there is an important point: Iran has not framed the issue simply as “banning all military vessels.” Rather, it has spoken of not allowing military vessels to operate in or enter the Strait without coordination or authorization under the system imposed by Tehran.
On May 31, the command of the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters announced that Iranian forces exercise “full authority” over the management of the Strait of Hormuz, and that all vessels are required to comply with designated routes and obtain authorization from the IRGC Navy. More importantly, it stated that any attempt by military vessels to interfere with the management of the Strait or disrupt maritime traffic would be met with a response from the Iranian armed forces.
There was an even clearer incident: in May, U.S. Central Command announced that American destroyers had transited the Strait of Hormuz toward the Gulf of Oman, and said that Iranian forces launched missiles, drones, and small boats during the transit, while U.S. forces responded.
Why is this point important?
If we consider it together with what we discussed earlier, there is a major difference between:
Closing Hormuz:
Preventing commercial vessels and oil tankers from passing.
And:
Redefining Hormuz:
Allowing trade and energy shipments to continue, but subjecting military movements to completely different rules.
The second scenario is strategically much more interesting.
Iran could, in practical terms, say:
Commercial and civilian vessels may pass under the new coordination and security system, while military vessels belonging to hostile states do not enjoy the same freedom of movement.
This also corresponds with the Iranian position that emerged in March, when Tehran informed the United Nations that vessels it considers “non-hostile” could transit provided that they do not participate in hostile activities and comply with the security rules announced by Iran. At the same time, this would not apply to vessels or assets belonging to the United States and Israel or to participants in the war against Iran.
But there is a major legal and military problem.
Hormuz is an international waterway, and therefore any attempt by Iran to impose a permanent ban on the passage of U.S. warships or other military vessels would clash with the American and Western interpretation of international navigation rules.
Therefore, the real question is not:
“Can Iran say no?”
Rather:
“Can Iran make that prohibition a fait accompli without turning it into a military confrontation?”
This is where what is currently taking place between Iran and Oman becomes important. As of today, August 4, 2026, Tehran and Muscat are negotiating new arrangements for navigation. Iran wants to control inbound traffic and supervise outbound traffic, while Washington rejects the idea of Iran becoming the authority controlling the transit routes.
This leads me to believe that the “New Hormuz” we discussed may be based on a clear distinction between two types of passage:
Type of Passage | Likely Direction
Oil and gas tankers
Permission to pass, but under new arrangements.
Commercial vessels
Permission to pass under a coordination system.
Vessels of friendly/neutral states
Easier passage.
Iranian military vessels
Iranian sovereign movement.
U.S./Israeli military vessels
Most vulnerable to being denied passage or facing confrontation.
This makes the issue far more serious than oil alone. If Iran succeeds in establishing the principle of “trade yes, hostile military vessels no,” it would be attempting to transform Hormuz from merely an international waterway into an international waterway governed by a special security regime, in which the most powerful littoral state imposes new military rules.
And this, precisely, is the core of the current struggle over Hormuz.