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What Does It Practically Mean for Iran to Become the Most Influential Power in the Strait of Hormuz?
In practical terms, Iran becoming the most influential power in the Strait of Hormuz does not necessarily mean that Iran legally “owns the strait.” What it means is that Iran would become the actor with the greatest ability to determine the conditions, security, and speed of passage. This is a very important distinction.
Current developments make the question more realistic. Iran and Oman are already negotiating a temporary shipping corridor, and Tehran says that part of the route will be in its territorial waters, while details concerning management, revenues, and security are still under negotiation.
What does this mean on the ground?
1. Iran can make passage “conditional”
Instead of the question being:
«Can the ship pass?»
It becomes:
«Under what conditions can the ship pass?»
This is the essence of what Kagan considers a strategic transformation. The article argues that Iran is seeking to transform passage from a practical right that is not subject to a decision by Tehran into a privilege that it can regulate, delay, or prevent for certain parties.
2. It can differentiate between ships
This is the most dangerous point.
For example, there could be a distinction between:
– A tanker from a country friendly to Iran.
– A tanker from a neutral country.
– A vessel linked to the United States or Israel.
– A military vessel.
There are already reports of Iranian-Omani negotiations that include preventing military vessels from transiting as part of the potential agreement.
3. Hormuz becomes a tool for putting pressure on sanctions
This is where I believe Kagan sees the issue clearly.
If Japan, South Korea, China, India, and others need the flow of energy through Hormuz, Tehran could effectively say:
«You want the energy supply to continue? Then you have to deal with me.»
This makes U.S. sanctions more difficult because countries would have to balance maintaining Washington’s approval with the security of their energy supplies. This is precisely one of the central conclusions of Kagan’s article.
4. Hormuz could become a source of revenue
If Iran and Oman actually agree on a mechanism for managing maritime traffic and sharing revenues, Tehran could obtain financial returns from its geographical position.
But caution is necessary here: the final agreement and fee mechanism have not yet been publicly finalized. Therefore, it would not be accurate to say that Iran has already begun imposing a fixed fee on every ship.
5. Influence does not mean closing the strait
This is a point I consider very important.
Iran may be more powerful when Hormuz is open but operating under its conditions, rather than when it is completely closed.
Why?
Because a complete closure:
– Harms Iran itself.
– Pushes the world to search for alternative routes.
– Gives the United States a stronger justification for military intervention.
– Unites countries against Iran.
By contrast, keeping the strait open under Iranian conditions gives Tehran sustained influence without bearing the full cost of a complete closure.
This is the true meaning of the “Hormuz weapon.”
And most importantly: What happens to America?
If Iran becomes capable of regulating passage through an important part of the strait, the meaning of the U.S. military presence in the Gulf changes.
The question will no longer simply be:
«Can the U.S. Navy enter the Gulf?»
It will become:
«Can it enter the Gulf without confronting the system that has become responsible for regulating passage?»
This explains why the struggle over Hormuz has become a struggle over sovereignty and influence, not merely over oil.
At the same time, the United States says it has cleared mines from the main shipping channel. It also carried out a strike on August 30 against Iranian platforms on Larak Island that, according to Washington, were connected to threats to maritime navigation. This indicates that control over Hormuz has not yet been definitively settled in favor of either side.
There is a factor that could change the equation
We should not assume that Iran can retain this leverage forever.
There are Gulf and international efforts to establish pipelines, ports, and alternative routes that bypass Hormuz. The more successful these projects become, the lower the strategic value of the strait will be for Iran. A recent analysis has warned that the importance of Hormuz could decline in the coming years if alternative export routes succeed.
Therefore, I would summarize the issue as follows:
Before the war:
America = the military power guaranteeing maritime navigation
Iran = a power capable of threatening maritime navigation
In the scenario Kagan is discussing:
America = a military power present in the region
Iran = the power that cannot be bypassed when passage is being regulated
That is a huge difference.
However, I do not believe that the statement “Iran controls Hormuz” is entirely accurate at this moment. A more precise formulation would be:
«Iran is attempting to transform its military and geographical ability to disrupt Hormuz into permanent political influence over the rules governing its operation.»
If it succeeds, this would indeed be one of the biggest strategic transformations in the Gulf in decades.
What is particularly striking is that this transformation is exactly what makes Kagan’s analysis so interesting: he does not see Hormuz merely as an “Iranian pressure card”; rather, he sees the possibility of a new regional system in which Tehran becomes a party that cannot be bypassed.