Iran’s positions remain firm; regarding the Strait of Hormuz, it states that the situation will not return to the way it was before.

Related Articles

If Iran collects $2 million from every passing ship, what is the share of the countries overseeing the Gulf?

September 20, 2026

There are reports that Iran will prevent military vessels from entering the Strait of Hormuz.

September 15, 2026

What does it mean when we say that relations between Moscow and Tehran are strategic?

September 13, 2026

Haydari Nazar

25

This is a very important point, and I agree with you that the Iranian statement should not be interpreted merely as a threat to close the Strait. The declared position since March, and one that was reiterated later, is that the Strait of Hormuz will not return to the arrangements that existed before the war.

On March 25, the spokesperson for the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters said that the situation in the Strait “will not return to the past,” and that permission for passage would be determined by Iran. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf repeated in June that the Strait would not return to its previous operating status and that Iran would manage the waterway under new arrangements.

In my view, this Iranian statement therefore carries a strategic dimension far broader than simply closing the Strait:

• Before the war: Passage through Hormuz was treated as something close to routine.
• After the war: Tehran wants passage to become subject to a new security and political framework.
• Vessels belonging to adversaries: They may face restrictions or be denied passage.
• Neutral or friendly countries: Their vessels could continue to pass, but under arrangements established by Iran and Oman.
• The core message: Iran does not want to return to a situation in which freedom of navigation through Hormuz is effectively understood as an unconditional right for all parties.

This has become even clearer from recent developments. There has been discussion of new Iranian-Omani arrangements for managing passage, with Tehran and Washington differing over the nature of these arrangements and over who has the authority to determine shipping routes.

Therefore, I would revise my earlier prediction: If the Iranian leadership is genuinely committed to this position, I do not expect Hormuz to return to the “old normal” even if the war subsides.

The more likely outcome is the emergence of a “New Hormuz”: a strait that remains partially open or regulated, but in which Iran retains the practical ability to determine who passes, when they pass, and under what conditions.

In my view, this is more significant than closure itself, because Iran could transform Hormuz from a card it uses when war breaks out into a permanent strategic card in any regional or international negotiation.